RIGHTS UNDER UNAUTHORIZED CORPORATE CONTRACTS by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
RIGHTS UNDER UNAUTHORIZED CORPORATE
CONTRACTS.
A COMMENT ON PU.MAN's PALAcE CAR Co. V. CENTRAL
TRANSPORTATION CO., 171 U. S. 138.
The Supreme Court of the United States seems to have
finished the task which it set for itself some years ago of work-
ing out a complete theory of the rights of parties to unauthorized
corporate contracts. The Court in Thomas v. Railroad (xoi
U. S. 71; 1879) gave its adherence to the doctrine of special
capacities and refused to accept the common law doctrine of
general capacities which was strongly urged by counsel. In
Pennsylvania Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. (118 U. S. 29o; 1885)
the judges decided (against Mr. Justice Bradley's dissent) that
where a corporate contract is'unauthorized and the action is
necessarily founded upon it, no recovery can be bad against a
defendant in default, even when the defendant has had all that
was bargained for. In Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's
Palace Car Co. (i39 U. S. 24; i89o) the decision in the previous
case was emphasized by the announcement of a similar conclu-
sion in an action based upon a contract, although the facts
(differing in this respect from the earlier cases) were such as
would have supported an action in quasi-contract. In all
these cases the defendant was in default under an un-
authorized lease and the suits were suits to recover the
compensation stipulated for in the contract. The decisions
all proceeded upon the theory 'that when a corporation
affects to make a contract which is beyond the scope of its
chartered activity, its attempt is utterly futile and the resulting
agreement is one which will, under no circumstances, be en-
forced either at law or in equity. It seemed at the time to be
clear to a reader of these decisions that a corporation which
had become a party to an unauthorized or prohibited contract
was under a duty "to rescind and abandon the contract at the
earliest moment, and that the performance of that duty, though
delayed for several years, was a rightful act when done." (See
34 Am. Law Register and Rev. 308). When, however, there
arose a case in which the lessor, under an unauthorized lease,
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was recalled to a sense of duty by his discovery that he had
made a bad bargain, the Court refused to lend him the equitable
aid necessary to enable him to rescind the contract and regain
possession of the demised property. In other words, after de-
ciding that a defendant lessee was not bound to pay rent if he
found it inexpedient to continue the lease, the Court denied to
the lessor the reciprocal right to cancel tne lease at his option,
and take the subject matter out of the hands of the lessee.*
This eccentric decision was rendered all the more remarkable
by the apparent satisfaction with which Mr. Justice Gray cited
in support of the Court's conclusion a number of authorities.
which were applicable only to a case in which the defendant
and not the plaintiff was in default under the unauthorized
contract.t (See 34 Am. Law Register and Rev. 309 et seq.)
Throughout the whole series of cases, however, one result was
consistently arrived at by the Court-the denial of relief to a
plaintiff who sued upon the contract for money at law or for a
restitution of the property in equity. It remained for the Court
to give an air of symmetry to its theory by rendering a decision
in a case in which the lessor should be seeking to recover, in
an equitable proceeding, both the demised property and also
compensation for its use. Such a case was certain to arise
sooner or later, and it so happened that the precise question
was presented to the Court in the final stage of the litigation
which had already produced the decision in Central Transporta-
tion Company v. Pullman's Palace Car Co. in 139 U. S. 24. The
decision in question is Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central
Transportation Co., 171 U. S. 133; (1898). In order to arrive at a
clear understanding of the significance of this decision it is
necessary to begin by summarizing briefly the successive
stages of the litigation. It is aside from the purpose of this
paper to discuss that portion of the decision which deals with
the lessor's lack of authority to make the lease. It will be
assumed that the lessor was a quasi-public corporation and
that the necessary legislative permission was wanting. (See
34 Am. Law Register and Rev. 301 et seq.) A corporation was
organized under the general manufacturing corporation law of
Pennsylvania, and the purpose of its incorporation was stated
to be ' the transportation of passengers in railroad cars con-
structed and to be owned by the said company' under certain
*St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Terre Haute and Indianapolis R. R. Co.,
145 U. S. 393.
f See,.for example, Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 1o3 U. S. 49.
YALE LA W JOURNAL.
patents. The Pullman's Palace Car Company was desirous
of obtaining a lease of all the cars of the Pennsylvania
corporation, and, in order that all doubt as to the right
of the latter to make such a contract might be removed,
application was made to the legislature for a special act, which
extended the period of corporate existence for a term of years,
authorized an increase of its capital stock and expressly
empowered it "to enter into contracts with corporations of this
or any other state for the leasing or hiring and transfer to them
or any of them," of its "railway cars and other personal
property." Eight days after the passage of this act the lease
was executed and for some sixteen or seventeen years the
company lessee paid the stipulated rental when and as the same
became due. The company lessee at the end of anine months"
period for which no rental had been paid refused to pay upon
the lessor's demand, on the ground that the contract of the
lease was invalid. In this position the lessee was sustained,
first, by the United States Circuit Court for the Third Circuit,
and afterwards by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Mr. Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court, adopted the view that the corporation lessor, originally a
strictly private corporation organized like large numbers of
others in Pennsylvania under the general manufacturing cor-
poration law, became a quasi-public corporation with public
duties to perform in virtue of the special act, which increased
the duration of its corporate life and authorized an increase of
its capital stock. The corporation, being in this view a cor-
poration with public duties to perform, could make no lease of
its property without legislative consent; and he voiced the
opinion of the court to the effect that the legislative authority
to make a lease could not, in this case, be construed to
authorize a lease of all the property of the corporation, since
such a contract would involve the abdication by the corporation
of the powers which it possessed and the cessation by it of the
performance of the duties imposed upon it by law. Having
decided that the contract of lease was 'unlawful and void,
because it was beyond the powers conferred upon the plaintiff
by the Legislature,' the court decided that no performance
on either side could give the unlawful contract any validity or
be the foundation of any right of action upon it. ' Whether this
plaintiff could maintain any action against this defendant in
the nature of a quantum mcruit, or otherwise, independently
of the contract need not be considered, because it is not
presented by this record, and has not been argued. This action,
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according to the declaration and evidence, was brought and
prosecuted for the single purpose of recovering sums, which the
defendant had agreed to pay by the unlawful contract, and
which, for the reasons and upon the authorities above cited, the
defendant is not liable for.' Mr. Justice Gray hus states the
reason for the rule, which is *applied to this case: "A
contract of a corporation, which is ultra vires in the proper
sense, that is to say, outside the object of its creation as defined
in the law of its organization, and, therefore, beyond the
powers conferred upon it by the Legislature, is not voidable
only, but wholly void and of no legal effect. The objection
to the contract is not merely that the corporation ought not to
have made it, but that it could not make it. The contract
cannot be ratified by either party, because it could not have
been authorized by either."
Before the decision just summarized had been rendered the
Pullman Company filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court
seeking to restrain the prosecution of pending suits for rent
and also to enjoin the institution of new suits. The Pullman
Company stated its willingness to pay to the Transportation
Company such sums by way of compensation for the use of the
property as the Court should think fit. The bill averred the
invalidity of the lease and prayed that the Court declare the
lease void and not enforcible beyond the obligation to make
return of the property or just compensation for such of it as
could not be returned. There was also a prayer for an account.
The Transportation Company by answer denied the averrments
of the bill in regard to the invalidity of the lease. The Court
declined to enjoin pending suits for rent, but granted the prayer
as far as new suits were concerned. When the Supreme Court
rendered its decision declaring the lease invalid and refusing a
recovery to the lessor, the Pullman Company found itself em-
barrassed by the pendency of its bill in equity in which it had
offered to make just compensation for the property. The Pull-
man Company accordingly moved to dismiss its own bill, but
the Transportation Company opposed the motion and took
advantage of its opportunity by asking leave to file a cross-bill
in order to avail itself of the lessees' tenders of relief. The Cir-
cuit Court refused the Pullman Company's motion and allowed
the Transportation Company to file the cross-bill. This bill
conceded (as under the decision in x39 U. S. it was bound to
concede) that the lease was invalid; and it was so framed as to
take advantage of the Pullman Company's offer of compensa-
tion. The crpss-bill also prayed that the Pullman Company be
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declared trustee for the Transportation Company of certain
contracts and patents (the benefit of which had passed to the
Pullman Company under the lease) together with the past and
future proceeds of operating under them. The cross-bill also
asked for discovery and an accounting. The Pullman Company
demurred: (i) on the ground that the cross-bill was filed con-
trary to the practice of the Court and that the Court had no
jurisdiction thereof; (2) to that part of the cross-bill which
related to the trusteeship of patents and contracts; and (3) to that
part of the cross-bill relating to the account of past and future
proceeds. The demurrers were overruled with leave to present
the question on final hearing. The Pullman Company then
answered the cross-bill, reasserting the invalidity of the unau-
thorized lease, and "that being null and void between the par-
ties hereto because of such character of the agreement, it can
not be made the lawful foundation of any action or application
for any relief whatever between the parties thereto." And this
respondent submits that the rule which precludes the granting
of relief by any Court of either equity or law upon a contract
void for contravention of public policy, forbade this Circuit
Court to allow such affirmative relief upon this cross-bill which
asserts no claim of right not founded directly upon the express
understandings of this contract of lease, held void by this
Court itself and by the Supreme Court for the reasons afore-
said." The answer further denied the existence of any duty to
return the property or account for it. After hearing proofs, the
Circuit Court held that it was a case for an accounting for the
value of the property delivered to the lessee plus the earnings
since the date of such delivery minus the rent already paid for
the same. The Court referred the case to a master who recom-
mended a decree in favor of the Transportation Company for
$4,235,o44 and costs. The Pullman Company appealed to the
Supreme Court and also to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The
appeal direct to the Supreme Court was taken upon the theory
that the Pullman Company had been deprived of its right of
trial by jury. The motion to dismiss the appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals was refused. A motion was then made in the
Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal and an application was
made for a certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Third District; which application, "on account of the peculiar
circumstances "-as the case would come before the Supreme
Court in one way or the other-was granted and the record was
returned by virtue of the writ.
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The Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Peckham, approved the
refusal of the Court below to allow the original bill to be with-
drawn and also the granting of the Transportation Company's
motion for leave to file the cross-bill. The Court then proceeded
to pass upon the lease and declared it to be void as being beyond
the corporate power of the lessor and as involving an abandon-
ment of duty. The Court also intimated that there was strong
ground for condemning the lease as being in unreasonable
restraint of trade. "In making the lease," said the Court, "the
lessor was certainly as much in fault as the lessee." The argu-
ments based upon ratification by performance and estoppel of
the defendant to deny the validity of the lease were reviewed
and discarded. Bath Gas Light Company v. Claffy (I5I N. Y.
24) had been pressed upon the consideration of the Court as
illustrating the prevailing tendency of American Courts to
enforce so-called ultra vires contracts between the parties. "It
is true," said the Court, "that Courts in different states have
allowed a recovery in such cases. . . . but in the case of
this lease now before the Court a recovery of the rent due
thereunder was denied the lessor, although the lessee had
enjoyed the possession of the property in accordance with the
terms of the lease." The Court thus announced its determina-
tion to adhere to its views as already promulgated and pro-
ceeded to assimilate the case of an unauthorized lease to the case
of an immoral or illegal contract, remarking, "Ex dolo malo non
oritur actio." "In no way and through no channels, directly or
indirectly, will the Courts allow an action to be maintained for
the recovery of property delivered under an illegal contract
where, in order to maintain such recovery, it is necessary to
have recourse to that contract. The right of recovery must
rest upon a disaffirmance of the contract, and it is permitted
only because of the desire of the Courts to do justice as far as
possible to the party who has made payment or delivered
property under a void agreement and which, in justice, he ought
to receive."
Coming next to the question of what, in justice, the Trans-
portation Company had a right to receive, the Court assented
to the view of the Court below that the lessor was entitled to
recover back the property or its value. The Court, however,
refused to recognize the market price of the lessor's stock at
the date of the lease as being an indication of the value of the
property, and also refused to take into consideration the con-
tracts and patent rights, which, before the date of the return
of the property, had gradually passed out of existence by limi-
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tation of time. The amount fixed by the decree below was
accordingly reduced to $727,846.50 with interest from January
i, 1885. It thus appears that the Court, while treating an unau-
thorized railroad lease as immoral and illegal, and while unwill-
ing to give equitable aid to a plaintiff who seeks to disaffirm
it, is nevertheless ready to give relief to a plaintiff whose
primary wish is not to disaffirm, but to enforce.
The progress of this cause cdebre has been described in con-
siderable detail, not merely because its progress is instructive,
but because of certain practical questions which are suggested
by it. It must not be forgotten that corporation law is a
department of commercial law, and that it is of paramount
importance to the community that it should lend itself to the
legitimate needs of business men. Its rules should be readily
comprehended and readily applied. The corporation is almost
as common a figure in the world of industry and industrial
enterprise as is the individual merchant or trader. We cannot
long tolerate a legal system which requires of us one or the
other of two kinds of commercial conduct according to whether
we deal with an individual or a corporation. If difficulties and -
disputes arise, the means of settling them promptly by appeal
to the courts must be at hand. How far does the Supreme
Court's theory of rights under unauthorized corporate contracts
conform to the standard of commercial expediency? Thd case
in hand furnishes us with material from which to form a con-
clusion. When the lease was originally proposed in 1870, com-
petent counsel was retained to draw an act of legislature
authorizing the making of it. The act was carefully drawn
and duly passed and the lease was executed eight days after-
ward. The parties conformed to the terms of the agreement
until 1885, when the lessee repudiated it. It is a fact that none
of the able counsel who at the time represented the parties
believed for a moment that the lease was void for lack of
authority. It was simply a case in which the lessee thought
that a strategic advantage could be gained by taking chances
with the law. That the defense of "ultra vires" was an after-
thought, appears from the circumstance that it was not inter-
posed among the variousp defenses to the first suit for rent. See
139 U. S. 62. In the next suit the defense was set up and the
Court below sustained it. It took five years from the date of
default to obtain a decision of the Supreme Court which, to
the surprise of all concerned, declared the lease invalid on
the ground that such a lease was not contemplated by the
enabling act! In the meanwhile the equitable proceedings
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were pending, as has been already explained. Learned coun-
sel fenced with one another over nice points of equity prac-
tice and pleading. Nine years after the default a decision was
obtained in the Circuit Court (65 Fed. Rep. 158) which led to a
reference to a master. The amount which was awarded to the
lessor by the master was so large that the lessee began to doubt
the wisdom of the campaign which it had inaugurated. Finally,
however, after about thirteen years of litigation, the wisdom
of "taking chances with the law" was vindicated, as the
amount of the award was so reduced as to show a balance of
advantage in favor of the lessee on the whole transaction.
During all this time the stock of the lessor had been rising and
falling in the market and its fluctuations offered tempting
opportunities for speculation. The litigation had been weari-
some and costly. Neither party was wholly satisfied with the
result. Thp decision, regarded as a legal precedent, leaves
doubt in the mind of the profession as to how far the Court
was influenced by the presence of the lessee's tender of com-
pensation. Would a similar result be reached in a case from
which this feature is absent? As long as this question remains
open, the decision cannot be said to have made the way plain for
the future. Nor is it easy to perceive how a recovery on any
terms will hereafter be justified consistently with the conclu-
sion reached in i45 U. S. as to the position of the parties to
unauthorized railroad leases.
The decision indeed accords with the Court's theory of cor-
porate power. It is obviously logical to refuse to enforce an
agreement if one or both of the parties lacks the necessary
contractual capacity. But does not the inconvenience of the
conclusion call for a re-examination of the premise? It is sub-
mitted that we shall never see our commercial law in a satisfac-
tory state until the courts re-establish the common law doctrine
of general capacities,* treating contracts made beyond the lim-
its of chartered activity as contracts prohibited but not void-
and leaving the state to punish the disregard of the prohibition,
while enforcing the contract between the parties. The enforce-
ment of corporate contracts in spite of objections as to cor-
porate power represents the overwhelning tendency of Ameri-
can decisions. The Supreme Court has given the contrary doc-
trine a fair trial and the result is, from the practical point of
*For a vindication of the doctrine of general capacities as being the doc-
trine of the common law, see Pollock on Contracts, Appendix, Note D., "Lim-
its of Corporate Power."
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view, a failure. As between the federal courts and a majority
of the state courts the advantage is with the former as respects
logic and with the latter as respects commercial convenience.
The law must, of course, be logical. But shall we sacrifice com-
mercial convenience to logic-or reform our premises so that
logic and convenience may coincide?
GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER.
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